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NOTES
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE CORPORATE
PLAINTIFF: APPLICABILITY OF THE NEW YORK
TIMES STANDARD TO CORPORATE DEFAMATION
AND PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of personal defamation' exists to protect the reputation
of individuals from false statements. The United States Supreme
Court's recognition of the competing interests of free speech and press'
in the personal defamation context has resulted in a constitutional
privilege for media-defendants.3 This constitutional privilege requires
that plaintiffs deemed "public officials"4 or "public figures"' prove that
the defendant made the defamatory statement with "actual malice"'
before recovery is available. By analogy to personal defamation, lower
federal courts have applied the actual malice standard to defamation
1. The term "personal defamation," for purposes of this note, will refer to
defamation actions where the plaintiff is a natural person, as distinguished from a
corporation. The term "defamation" will be used to refer to personal and corporate
defamation collectively. Defamation is a term describing the twin torts of libel and
slander. Generally, libel is a written defamation, while slander is oral. Prosser has
defined defamation as a false statement which tends to "injure reputation, diminish
the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite
adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." W. PROSSER. LAW
OF TORTS 111, at 739 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Eaton, The American Law of Defama-
tion Through Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA.
L. REV. 1349 (1975); Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1983).
2. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
3. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
4. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See infra notes 12-18
and accompanying text.
5. Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See infra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text.
6. Actual malice means "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not:' New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280. The Supreme
Court later refined its definition of actual malice by explaining: "[R]eckless conduct
is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would
have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his
publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968). Actual malice must
be proved by "clear and convincing proof." Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
342 (1974).
Morgan: The First Amendment and the Corporate Plaintiff:  Applicability o
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
848 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
actions where a corporation was the plaintiff.' Further, two federal
district courts have applied the actual malice standard to corporate
plaintiffs in product disparagement actions.' This note will focus on
whether the actual malice standard should be applied to corporate
defamation and product disparagement actions, and if so, what analysis
should be used in determining its applicability.
First, there is an examination of the history behind the first
amendment in personal defamation cases. The next section addresses
the implications of the commercial speech doctrine. This is followed
by an examination of the tort common law that has developed in the
area of corporate defamation and product disparagement. Whether
corporate defamation and product disparagement actions should
receive first amendment protection, and how lower federal courts have
decided the issue, then is discussed. Finally, an approach for deter-
mining first amendment protection for these two torts is suggested.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND DEFAMATION LAW
The history of the first amendment in the personal defamation
context must be examined to determine whether the actual malice
standard applied in personal defamation actions should also apply to
corporate defamation and product disparagement. Prior to 1964, the
United States Constitution was not interpreted to protect libel.1"
Libelous statements were not considered an essential part of the
exposition of ideas and were of such slight social value that any
benefits which could be derived from them were clearly outweighed
7. A defamation action where the plaintiff is a corporation is referred to
as corporate defamation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs S 561 (1981). Partnerships
and unincorporated associations may also bring defamation actions. See id. at 5 562
and W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS. S 111, at 745 n.14-15.
8. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 508
F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass.), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1981), affd
- U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984); Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Product disparagement refers
to defamatory statements which "depreciate or disparage the merits, utility or value
of any person's property." See Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 COLUM. L. REV.
13, 132 (1913) (quoting G. BOWER, CODE OF THE LAW OF ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 242
(1908)). Product disparagement is also referred to as trade libel, slander of title, slander
of goods, disparagement of title, disparagement of goods, unfair competition, interference
with prospective advantage or injurious falsehood. See Prosser, Injurious Falsehood:
The Basis of Liability, 59 COLUhM. L. REV. 425 (1959).
9. Commercial speech has been defined as expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
10. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 39, 49 n.10 (1961; Roth
v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
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by the social interest in order and morality.11 However, the landmark
case of New York Times v. Sullivan,2 held that the first amendment
guarantees of free speech and press provide some constitutional
protection to libelous statements."
To safeguard first amendment rights, the Court in New York
Times implemented the actual malice standard. This standard requires
plaintiffs who are public officials 4 to prove that the defendant made
a defamatory statement with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was false."5 Since most states
had used a strict liability standard in libel actions," the actual malice
11. See Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, a full page advertisement was
taken out by a civil rights group which made a number of allegations about the
Montgomery, Alabama police department. Some of these allegations were inaccurate.
L.B. Sullivan, one of three elected commissioners of the City of Montgomery, whose
duties included supervision of the police department, filed suit against the New York
Times. Although Sullivan was not mentioned by name in the advertisement, he relied
on Alabama law which presumes the reputation of a public official is injured when
statements are made about the agency he controls. The jury found for the plaintiff
and awarded $500.000 in damages, but the United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court felt that the common law fair comment doctrine, which protected speech
concerning public officers and employees, justified giving constitutional protection to
the media when the defendant is a public official. Although the common law fair com-
ment doctrine applied the privilege only to opinions, criticism and comment, see W.
PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS S 118, at 819, the Court extended the privilege to false asser-
tions of fact. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283.
13. The first amendment protects the press from liability for libelous
statements unless knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth can be shown. New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
14. The Court left open the parameters regarding who is a public official.
Justice Brennan in a footnote of the opinion said: "We have no occasion to determine
how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designa-
tion would extend for purposes of the rule, or otherwise specify categories of persons
who would or would not be included." Id at 283 n.23. Two years later the Court defined
the term "public official" as all government employees "who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of govern-
mental affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
15. The actual malice standard was being used by a number of state courts
at the time of its adoption by the Supreme Court. The Kansas Supreme Court case
of Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908), was cited in the New York
Times opinion as support for the standard. The Kansas standard was applicable to
matters of "public concern, public men, and candidates for office." New York Times,
376 U.S. at 285.
16. The Alabama state law used in the lower courts in New York Times, would
deem a publication "libelous per se" if the words tend to injure the reputation of the
plaintiff. Once libel per se is established, unless the defendant proves truth, general
damages are presumed without a showing of pecuniary loss. However, punitive damages
were recoverable only upon a showing of actual malice. In 1974, the Court expressly
rejected strict liability in personal defamation actions. Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc..
418 U.S. 323 (1974). At common law, a plaintiff need only put into evidence a state-
ment which tends to injure his reputation and prove that the defendant was responsible
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standard placed a greater burden on the plaintiff. The Court
recognized that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate
and, therefore, this "breathing space" was necessary to protect the
freedom of expression. 7 Without this Constitutional standard, criticism
of official conduct would be "chilled" and result in self-censorship, due
to the defendant's difficulty and expense in proving the truth of the
alleged libelous statement. Therefore, this Constitutional standard was
necessary to preserve "uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate" on
public issues. 8
This interest in free speech was furthered three years later when
the class of plaintiffs required to show actual malice was expanded.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts," the Court extended the constitu-
tional privilege to "public figures." A plaintiff could be deemed a public
figure due to his position in society, or where he voluntarily thrusts
himself into the vortex of a public issue."
The ultimate extension of the constitutional privilege occurred
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia." In Rosenbloom, the trial court deter-
mined that the New York Times standard was not applicable to a
magazine distributor.' However, the Supreme Court held that the New
York Times standard did apply.23 The Court concluded that the
constitutional privilege would apply even to a private person if the
defamatory statement concerned matters of public or general interest.
for uttering or publishing it. This strict liability standard did not require the plaintiff
to prove the statement was false or to show he suffered any actual injury. The defen-
dant could escape strict liability either by proving the statement was true or that
it was privileged. See Eaton, supra note 1, at 1352-54.
17. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
18. Id. at 270-71.
19. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (consolidated cases).
20. In Curtis Publishing Co., the plaintiff, Butts, was athletic director of the
University of Georgia. A defamatory statement printed in the Saturday Evening Post
alleged that Butts and University of Alabama football coach Paul "Bear" Bryant had
"fixed" a game between their respective schools. The Court held that Butts had attained
the status of public figure due to his position. In the companion case to Curtis Publishing
Co., Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the plaintiff was retired Major
General Edwin Walker. The defendant had falsely characterized Walker's activities
at a riot at the University of Mississippi. The Court held that Walker's activities
amounted to a thrusting of his personality into the vortex of an important public issue-
school desegregation-and that was sufficient reason to classify him as a public figure.
21. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion).
22. The defendant's radio station defamed the plaintiff by erroneously report-
ing that the plaintiff was a "girlie book peddler" and was in the "smut literature racket."
Id, at 34.
23. Id. at 52.
24. Id. at 33-34. Matters of "public or general interest," which will be referred
to in this note as the Rosenbloom public interest test, was a phrase originating in
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 [1985], Art. 3
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The public interest test shifted the focus from the status of the
plaintiff to the public's right to be informed about certain issues. In
Rosenbloom, the public had a vital interest in the proper enforcement
of its criminal obscenity laws.1 Justice Brennan noted that if a matter
is in the public interest, it cannot suddenly become less important
because a private plaintiff is involved or because the plaintiff did not
voluntarily choose to become involved. ' The Court did not decide what
constituted a matter of public interest, but this point was mooted in
1974 when the Court rejected the public interest test.
In rejecting the Rosenbloom public interest test, the Court
returned to the status approach of determining public figures. In Gertz
v. Robert Welsh, Inc.,"8 the Court held that there are three classes
of public figures. First, there are those individuals who have general
fame and notoriety in the community. Since the constitutional privilege
extends to statements about all aspects of these plaintiff's lives, they
are referred to as "all purpose public figures." Second, there are
those who have thrust themselves into the forefront of a particular
public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues
Barndeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890). The concept of public
interest was behind the adoption of the actual malice standard in New York Times.
"Debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open." New York Times,
376 U.S. at 270-71 [emphasis added]. Public interest was also important in Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Time, Inc., a private plaintiff could not recover for
invasion of privacy which placed the victim in a false light, without a showing of ac-
tual malice, where the publication related to a "matter of public interest." Id. at 387-88.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom specifically rejected the public figure test
in favor of the public interest test. He claimed that there was no logic in distinguishing
between public and private figures. The reason the New York Times standard was
applied to public officials and public figures was to encourage the ventilation of public
issues. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46 [emphasis added].
25. The petitioner conceded that the police campaign to enforce the obscenity
laws was an issue of public interest. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 40.
26. Id- at 43. One factor which led the Court to reject the Rosenbloom test
was the difficulty it imposed upon state and federal judges who had to decide on an
ad hoc basis which publications were of general or public interest. Gertz, 418 U.S.
323 (1974). Justice Marshall referred to this task as determining "what information
is relevant to self-government." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall. J., dissenting).
27. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323.
28. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
29. In Gertz, the plaintiff was the attorney for the family of a boy shot by
a policeman. The defendant published an article describing the plaintiff as a "Communist-
fronter" and "Leninist." Since the plaintiff was not well known, the Court refused
to characterize him as an all purpose public official. In fact, none of the prospective
jurors had ever heard of the plaintiff. Evidence that the plaintiff had authored several
books and articles on legal subjects and was active in professional and community
affairs, had little impact on the Court. Id. at 325-26, 351-52.
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involved. This class is the "limited purpose public figure."' This person
is a public figure only in regard to the specific public controversy.
Third, there are those deemed "involuntary public figures,"'" who have
exhibited no purposeful activity of their own, yet nevertheless, are
involved in a public controversy. The Court returned to the status
approach because it believed that the reputation of private individuals
was not adequately protected by the public interest test.2
The government's interest in protecting the reputation of private
individuals was determined to be superior to the interest in the reputa-
tion of public officials and public figures, and therefore, required
greater protection. The reasons for the protection are two-fold. The
first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help: using channels
of communication to rebut or correct the lie.' Since the private person
has less access to the media than a public official or public figure,
he has less opportunity to rebut the defamatory statement and is more
vulnerable to injury.- Furthermore, public officials and public figures
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory statements. A private individual who has not voluntarily
stepped into the limelight of public office, nor thrust himself into a
public controversy, cannot be said to have assumed the risk of such
an injury. 7 Therefore, the private individual is more deserving of
30. The plaintiff in Gertz was not a limited purpose public figure. The plain-
tiff played no part in the criminal prosecution of the policeman and he never discussed
any aspect of the criminal or civil litigation with the press. His minimal role at a
coroner's inquest was not enough to say that he had thrust himself into the vortex
of a public controversy. Id. at 351-52.
31. The Court noted that instances of involuntary public figures are extremely
rare. Id. at 345.
32. "The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom
plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest [in protecting the reputation of
a private person] to a degree that we find unacceptable." Id. at 346.
33. "[Tlhe individual's right to protection of his own good name 'reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty'." Id. at 341, (quoting
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
34. Id. at 344.
35. Id. at 344. Justice Brennan's dissent suggests that access to the media
to rebut is not a viable argument to support the proposition that public figures need
less protection than private individuals. Very few people can command the media to
rebut a defamatory article. Further, "denials, retractions, and corrections are not 'hot'
news, and rarely receive the prominence of the original story." Id at 363 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (quoting from Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46). The majority opinion recognizes
Justice Brennan's argument in a footnote, "Of course the opportunity for rebuttal seldom
suffices to undo harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted
in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with the lie." Id. at 344 n.9.
36. Id. at 345.
37. Justice Brennan discounts the assumption of risk argument also. The idea
that public figures have assumed the risk of public exposure, while private individuals
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 [1985], Art. 3
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recovery. Since the private individual is more vulnerable to injury
and more deserving of recovery, the Court reasoned that, as a plaintiff
in a defamation action, he should not be held to the same standard
as a public official or public figure. 8 Rather, the states were left to
determine the evidence that a private individual would be required
to show in order to recover.-
Deferring to the states to establish the standard of liability in
a private individual's defamation action was not done without some
guidance. Although the states could set their own standard, liability
could not be imposed without fault." In addition to the fault require-
ment, Gertz also affected state remedies in defamation actions."
Gertz constitutionalized areas of state defamation law concern-
ing damages. Under the Gertz ruling states cannot permit recovery
of presumed or punitive damages if liability is predicated on a stan-
dard less than actual malice.2 Also, where liability is not based on
actual malice, the plaintiffs damages are limited to "actual injury.' ' 3
Although the Court did not define actual injury, the opinion noted
that it is not limited to out-of-pocket loss and could include impair-
ment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humilia-
tion, and mental anguish and suffering." Limiting recovery to actual
injury was intended to reduce the arbitrariness and magnitude of
damage awards. The constitutionalizing of state defamation law in
the area of damages and fault requirement has also resulted in some
confusion in the courts.
have not, is deemed by Justice Brennan to be a "legal fiction." He feels that all people,
voluntarily or not, are "public men" to a degree. This risk of exposure is an essential
incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and
press. Id. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 345-46.
39. A majority of jurisdictions have adopted a negligence standard for personal
defamation actions. Four states have adopted the more media-protective standards
of gross negligence or actual malice. See Note, Defamation and State Constitutions:
The Search for a State Law Based Standard After Gertz, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 665,
670 & n.27-28 (1983).
40. Gertz. 418 U.S. at 347. The elimination of strict liability in Gertz impacted
many state defamation laws. See supra note 16.
41. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
42. The Court left open the question of whether presumed or punitive damages
were constitutional if liability is predicated on actual malice. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The Court attempted to reconcile the state damages law with the com-
peting first amendment interests by limiting defamation damages to actual injury. The
first amendment interest was also emphasized by barring punitive damages absent
a showing of actual malice. Id.
46. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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The Gertz requirement that individuals deemed to be limited pur-
pose public figures and involuntary public figures thrust themselves
into a public controversy l has caused some confusion. Specifically, the
pertinent issue involves defining a public controversy. The post-Gertz
cases seem to indicate that the quality of the controversy is impor-
tant, not the quantity of people interested.'8 In one case, a wealthy
Palm Beach socialite was involved in a highly publicized divorce
proceeding."9 The Court refused to characterize the plaintiff as a
limited purpose public figure, on the grounds that this was not the
type of public controversy referred to in Gertz.5 The Court said that
if it were to equate "public controversy" with all matters of interest
to the public, it would be reinstating Rosenbloom.5 The Court has also
held that although a matter is admittedly of public interest, that is
not enough for public figure status. ' The Court is suggesting that
a qualitative analysis of the controversy is required. However, until
the Court more narrowly defines "quality," inconsistency will reign.
Inconsistency also arises because of the difficulty in balancing the
opposing interests.
An analysis of New York Times and its progeny illustrates the
Court's balancing of the individual's reputation interest with the free
speech and press interest of the media. Since similar interests are
considered in corporate defamation and product disparagement actions,
the lower federal courts have analogized to personal defamation actions
in reaching their decisions.' However, determining first amendment
47. "More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves
to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
48. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979)
(held that petitioner's failure to appear before the grand jury concerning his alleged
Soviet espionage activities was newsworthy, but was not sufficient to render peti-
tioner a public figure); See also infra note 50.
49. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
50. The Florida Supreme Court characterized the Firestone divorce as a "cause
celebre." There was evidence of 88 press clippings concerning the divorce proceedings
and numerous press conferences were given by the plaintiff. However, the Supreme
Court said that while the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may
be of interest to some portion of the reading public, this is not the sort of public
controversy referred to in Gertz. Id. at 453.
51. Id. at 454. Justice Marshall's dissent said that the conclusion reached by
the majority that this is not the public controversy referred to in Gertz can only be
reached if the Court felt these facts were not relevant to the "affairs of society,"
and therefore not in the public inteiest. Id. at 488 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In effect,
Justice Marshall is saying that by addressing the issue of public controversy, the Court
is reviving Rosenbloom.
52. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167.
53. See infra notes 115-16.
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protection in the corporate defamation and product disparagement con-
text requires an initial inquiry into the implications the commercial
speech doctrine may have in this area.
III. IMPACT OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
The common law tort of product disparagement has usually been
applied in the context of a dispute between business competitors.
While an advertisement disparaging a competitor's product is an
example, a product disparagement action may also lie where the
disparaging party is the media. This usually occurs in the context
of a consumer magazine evaluating products on the marketplace.,
These two different scenarios may result in different levels of first
amendment protection, depending on whether the statement is pure
speech or commercial speech.
Commercial speech at one time was thought to have no first
amendment protection. In 1942, the Supreme Court held that a hand-
bill soliciting customers to a commercial enterprise was commercial
speech and that the Constitution imposed no restraint on governmental
regulation of such speech." The Court's analysis centered on the
motive of the speaker in its characterization of the handbill as-com-
mercial speech. 8 This approach suggests that if a speaker's motive
is to advance his own commercial interests, the statement would be
commercial speech. 57 But if the speaker is expressing an idea, it is
pure speech." This dichotomy leads to different levels of protection.
Where the defendant in a product disparagement action is a member
of the media and his intent is to inform the public about a product,
there is full first amendment protection for the speech. 9 On the other
54. See, e.g., Bose Corp., 692 F.2d 189; Simmons Ford, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742;
General Products Co. Inc. v. Meredith Corp., 562 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Va. 1981).
55. See Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
56. In Valentine, plaintiffs double-faced handbill conveyed on one side a political
message, while the other side was commercial speech. The Court recognized plaintiff's
attempt to subterfuge the municipal ordinance banning commercialspeech and held
that the handbills could be regulated. Addressing the motive of the speaker to deter-
mine whether an expression is commercial speech has been referred to as a "motive-
based test." See Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing
the Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963 (1975).
57. See infra note 58.
58. Communications expressing ideas or opinions about social, political, artistic
or religious matters are pure speech, while communications which are about products
and services offered for sale are commercial speech. Full first amendment protection
is afforded the former, but not the latter. See Note, supra, note 56, at 974. See also
Central Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. 557 (speech related solely to economic interests
of speaker is commercial speech).
59. See Note, supra note 56, at 976.
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hand, if a trade competitor disparages the plaintiffs product for his
own commercial interests, the statement would be commercial speech
and unprotected." However, later cases have found that even com-
mercial speech is entitled to some first amendment protection."
Commercial speech which contains factual material of clear public
interest is protected by the first amendment. 2 The Supreme Court
has held that an advertisement in a newspaper which informed readers
of a placement service which arranged low-cost abortions in New York
hospitals and clinics was protected speech." The fact that the state-
ment appeared in the form of a paid advertisement was of no
consequence.6' The Court found that some commercial speech is
entitled to first amendment protection." This extension of first amend-
ment protection to some commercial speech still did not answer the
question of whether a competitor's disparaging statement should
receive any degree of protection. However, the 1976 case of Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,"
indicates how the Court would treat such an issue.
The Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy extended first
amendment protection to speech which "does no more than propose
a commercial transaction." ' This decision invalidated a statute which
made it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise
the price of prescription drugs.68 Since there was a strong consumer
interest in the price of drugs, it was deemed commercial speech and
entitled to some first amendment protection." Because disparaging
statements by a trade competitor would clearly be commercial speech,
this decision would appear to provide some first amendment protec-
tion in this area.
60. Id-
61. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia States Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
62. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
63. Since abortions were legal in New York, this is not unprotected speech
proposing an illegal transaction. See generally Central Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. 557.
64. Speech in the form of paid advertisement was found to have first amend-
ment protection eleven years before Bigelow. See New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.
65. "The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or services
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas." Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826.
66. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
67. Id. at 762.
68. Id. at 749-50 n.2.
69. Justice Blackmun noted that the consumer's interest in the free flow of
commercial information, "is keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the days
most urgent political debate." Id. at 763.
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However, the Court also said that not all commercial speech is
entitled to the same degree of protection."0 In fact, commercial speech
which is not truthful appears to be unprotected." Since the speech
in a product disparagement or corporate defamation action must be
false in order for the plaintiff to recover, this false speech would not
be protected. This point was enunciated in a later commercial speech
case which held that misleading commercial speech is not protected
at all by the first amendment.' Therefore, commercial speech disparag-
ing a competitor's product would not be protected and would be sub-
ject to the common law principle of fault. If the same disparaging
speech came from the media, it would probably be classified as pure
speech and entitled to full first amendment protection." Whether first
amendment protection should be available to media-defendants in
either corporate defamation or product disparagement actions requires
an examination of the characteristics of these two torts.
IV. NATURE OF THE TORTS: CORPORATE DEFAMATION AND
PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT
A. Introduction
A statement which falsely criticizes the quality of a corporation's
product may result in two different causes of action. If the false
accusation is that the product does not possess desirable qualities,
an action may lie for product disparagement. However, if the state-
ment concerning the quality of the product clearly maligns the cor-
poration itself, an action may lie for corporate defamation." Although
70. Id. at 770-71.
71. The Court said that it could foresee no obstacle to the state's dealing
effectively with the problem of false commercial speech. Id. at 771. Different degrees
of protection for false commercial speech is necessary to ensure that truthful and
legitimate commercial information is unimpaired. Two factors justify this conclusion:
First, the advertiser disseminating the information about his product knows more about
it than anyone else and has the ability to verify truth. Second, commercial speech
is more durable than other forms of speech. Since advertising is the sine qua non
of profits, there is less likelihood of a chilling effect. Therefore, greater objectivity
and hardiness of commercial speech make it less necessary to tolerate false commer-
cial speech. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
72. Central Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. 557.
73. See supra note 58. The issue of disparaging statements by a competitor
and its first amendment ramifications will not be further developed in this note. Rather,
this note will focus on corporate defamation and product disparagement actions and
their first amendment implications when the speaker is the media.
74. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, S 128, at 917-18.
75. A false statement directed at a corporation without regard to a product
may also result in a corporate defamation action.
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the two torts had different common law origins, several similarities
exist between them." Furthermore, if the constitutional changes in
the law of personal defamation are applicable to these two torts, their
differences are significantly narrowed.77 Therefore, to discuss product
disparagement, it is necessary to include a discussion of corporate
defamation.
B. Corporate Defamation
The law of defamation grew out of the twin torts of libel and
slander .7 At common law, a libelous publication was actionable per
se." This meant that the publisher was liable without proof of special
harm.10 A slanderous publication was actionable per se only in certain
instances." If none of the circumstances were present, a plaintiff would
have to show special harm to recover for a slanderous publication.2
Therefore, in both libel or slander the plaintiff could recover special
damages if he proved them.u These common law torts were later
referred to collectively as defamation."'
The law of defamation, which is designed to protect the
individual's reputation, has been used to protect the reputation of
corporations.' Although a corporation does not have a personal reputa-
tion, 86 it may be defamed by statements which cast aspersions on
76. See infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
78. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, S 111, at 737. A defamation is a communica-
tion which tends to harm the reputation of another so as to lower him in the estima-
tion of the community or to deter third persons from associating with him. RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 559 (1977).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 569 (1977).
80. Special harm refers to damages in the form of pecuniary loss. At common
law, general damages were always awarded upon a showing of actionable per se, unless
the defendant could prove truth or some other privilege. See also i& comment b.
81. Publication of a slander is actionable per se at common law if it imputes:
a) a criminal offense, b) a loathsome disease, c) a matter incompatible with plaintiffs
business, trade, profession, or office, or d) serious sexual misconduct. Id. S 570. Pro-
duct disparagement actions were not considered in exception (c) above and thus, required
a showing of special damages. Id. S 573 & comment g.
82. Id. S 575.
83. Special damages were awarded only upon proof of loss of something hav-
ing economic or pecuniary value. Mere loss of reputation was not sufficient to prove
special harm, unless such a loss also reflected some kind of economic or pecuniary
loss. Id.
84. Although the term "defamation" refers to both libel and slander, the law
has continued to treat these two torts as different causes of action. See generally W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 112.
85. See supra note 7.
86. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 111, at 745.
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its honesty, credit, efficiency or its prestige or standing in its field
of business." A statement which degrades the quality of a corpora-
tion's product, but also reflects on the corporation itself, may be
corporate defamation or product disparagement." A statement that
a butcher's meats are poisonous"' or that a painting bought from a
dealer is an obvious forgery," reflects on both the product and the
business entity. The plaintiff may therefore bring suit on behalf of
the business entity for defamation or for product disparagement."
Which action is pursued will depend on the nature of the statement,'
as well as the burden of proving falsity, recoverable damages, and
degree of fault, which vary between these two torts. The distinction
between these two torts can be seen by focusing on the elements of
product disparagement.
C. Product Disparagement
Product disparagement is intended to protect a plaintiff from
interference with prospect of sale or some other advantageous
relation. 3 Thus, the tort is intended to protect from pecuniary loss.
In contrast, defamation is intended to protect a reputation interest. 4
Due to the historical association with defamation, the tort of corporate
defamation is thought to protect an interest in reputation. These
87. Id. For example, a corporate defamation action would arise where a state-
ment imputes that a corporation traded with the enemy in time of war. Den Norske
Ameriekalinje Actiesselskabet v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 226 N.Y. 1, 122
N.E. 463 (1919).
88. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 128, at 918.
89. See Mowry v. Raabe, 89 Cal. 606, 27 Pac. 157 (1891); Blumhardt v. Rohr,
70 Md. 328, 17 Atl. 266 (1889).
90. See Freisinger v. Moore, 65 N.J.L. 286, 47 A. 432 (N.J. 1900).
91. These facts may also give rise to an action for personal defamation.
92. For a discussion of the distinction between defamation and product
disparagement, see Hibschman, Defamation or Disparagement?, 24 MINN. L. Rav. 625
(1940).
93. The common law of product disparagement was originally intended to pro-
tect a person's property or title. In tracing the history of product disparagement, Prosser
referred to the tort under the broader concept of "injurious falsehood." Injurious
falsehood originally concerned oral aspersions cast upon the plaintiffs ownership of
land. When these statements hindered the plaintiffs efforts of selling or leasing his
land, a cause of action arose. This seventeenth century tort was known as "slander
of title." During the nineteenth century, the tort of injurious falsehood was expanded
to encompass written aspersions reflecting upon the title of property other than land.
This concept later included statements referring to the quality of the plaintiffs property,
rather than mere title. This extension has become known as product disparagement,
when the property referred to is a product. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 128, at 915.
94. See supra note 1.
95. This interest is in protecting a business reputation. However, a corpora-
tion is not defamed by communications defamatory of its officers, agents, or
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different interests and distinct origins between product disparagement
and corporate defamation are reflected in the elements of each cause
of action.
The burden of proving the truth or falsity of the statement is
one distinction between the two torts. Both torts required proof of
publication and of the disparaging or defamatory nature of the
statements involved." In an action for product disparagement, the
plaintiff must plead and prove the statement is false, whereas in an
action for corporate defamation, falsity is presumed and truth is a
defense which must be proved by the defendant." Supreme Court deci-
sions constitutionalizing state defamation laws have no effect in this
area, although there have been some implications on the common law
concerning the distinction of recoverable damages.
The plaintiff in a product disparagement action must plead and
prove special damages in order to recover.98 Special damages require
a showing of pecuniary loss, usually lost profits." However, in defama-
tion actions the plaintiff rarely has to prove special damages.' At
common law, damages were presumed, at least to the extent of the
awarding of general damages.' Damages were presumed in defama-
tion actions because it was so likely that psychological injury would
occur to the individual. Another justification for presumed damages
was the uncertainty in calculating the extent of the injury.102 Due to
corporate defamation's origin in the law of defamation, damages were
also presumed."°3 However, a corporation cannot be said to suffer the
shareholders, unless the communication discredits the method by which the corpora-
tion conducts its business. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 561 comment a (1977).
96. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 128, at 920.
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 581A comment b (1977).
98. Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902). RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 633 (1977).
99. Although lost profits are the most common special damages recoverable
in product disparagement action, some courts have allowed recovery for the plaintiffs
legal proceedings expenses and other expenses in counteracting the disparagement.
See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 5 128, at 922-23.
100. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text for constitutional changes
in this area of the law.
102. General damages were presumed at common law since the defamation was
so likely to cause injury to reputation and because affixing an exact monetary amount
for present and future injury to the plaintiffs reputation, wounded feelings and humilia-
tion and consequential physical illness or pain was an impossible task. See Gertz, 418
U.S. 323 (White, J., dissenting).
103. See Bose Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1260.
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same psychological injury as a person."0 ' Also, it would not be dif-
ficult to calculate the extent of the injury, since these damages would
be pecuniary, much like those in product disparagement actions.' 5
Although the common law damage distinctions appear to be misplaced,
the differences have been narrowed by changes in constitutional
interpretation.
A constitutional restriction was placed on damage awards in
defamation actions by Gertz. The Gertz decision held that awarding
damages was not permissible without proof of actual injury, at least
where liability is predicated on fault less than actual malice.' 6 This
decision would appear to abandon presumed damages in defamation
actions. This rule should apply to corporate defamation actions as
well.'0 Therefore, a corporate defamation plaintiff will be required
to show actual injury to recover damages. This rule has no effect on
product disparagement, since plaintiffs were always required to meet
the stricter test of proving special damages. " Constitutional changes
which have narrowed the distinction between corporate defamation
and product disparagement in the damages area have also affected
the requisite fault distinction.
A defendant in a product disparagement action is subject to
liability if: (1) he knew of the falsity or acted with reckless disregard
concerning it, (2) he acted with ill will, or (3) he intended to interfere
with the economic interests of the plaintiff in an unprivileged
manner.10 In contrast, the common law fault requirement for defama-
tion was strict liability."0 However, Gertz eliminated strict liability
when the Court held that liability for personal defamation could not
104. Psychological injury may be incurred by a human, but a corporate entity
can only incur injury to its business reputation. See supra note 95.
105. At least one author has recognized the inconsistency in treating corporate
defamation and product disparagement actions differently. This author suggests a
mistake may have been made when corporations were recognized as being able to
bring a suit for defamation. See Development of the Law, Competitive Torts, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 895 (1964).
106. See supra note 16.
107. Presumed damages were allowed at common law since a defamatory state-
ment was so certain to cause psychological injury to a person and due to the difficulty
in calculating damages. However, a corporation cannot suffer psychological injury and
the pecuniary damages would not be difficult to calculate. Therefore, the case for aban-
doning presumed damages in personal defamation actions would be even stronger in
the corporate defamation and product disparagement context.
108. See supra notes 98-99.
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 623A (1977).
110. See supra note 16.
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be imposed without fault."' This holding requiring proof of fault should
be equally applicable to corporate defamation.12 However, it is
unknown what impact the decision has on product disparagement. If
Gertz is applicable to product disparagement, then the second and third
prongs listed above, acting with ill will and intending to interfere in
the plaintiffs economic interests would not be sustainable as a basis
for liability if the plaintiff is a public figure. This is because knowledge
or reckless disregard is not a part of these requirements."' However,
the first prong requirement of knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard, is very similar to the New York Times actual malice stan-
dard. Since product disparagement and corporate defamation are both
protecting a pecuniary interest, both causes of action may arise by
the same defamatory statement, and other common law distinctions
have narrowed, it would be consistent to apply the same fault
requirement to both actions. Therefore, if the actual malice standard
is applied to a plaintiff bringing a corporate defamation action, the
same standard will be assumed to apply to the plaintiff as if it were
a product disparagement action.
V. APPLICABILITY OF THE NEW YORK TIMES STANDARD TO
CORPORATE DEFAMATION AND PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT
A. Introduction
Application of the New York Times standard by lower federal
courts to corporate defamation suggests that the actual malice
standard is not limited to personal defamation actions.' This logic
has prompted two District Courts to extend the New York Times
standard to product disparagement actions.1 The courts have justified
111. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
112. The rationale for eliminating strict liability in personal defamation actions
would be even stronger in corporate defamation actions, since the interest in protect-
ing the reputation of a person would be greater than the corresponding interest in
the corporation's reputation.
113. The Restatement expresses no view as to the constitutionality in product
disparagement actions for the state of mind of ill will and intent to interfere. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 623A comment d (1977). These two states of mind may
have viability if the plaintiff is not a public figure, since Gertz requires only that liability
not be imposed without a finding of fault.
114. See, e.g., corporate defamation actions requiring showing of actual malice,
Steaks Unlimited v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980); Reliance v. Barron's, 442 F.
Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977; Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F.
Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, 417 F.
Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976); F & J Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,
Inc., 373 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
115. See Bose Corp., 692 F. 2d 189 (stereo loudspeaker manufacturer required
to show actual malice); Simmons Ford, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (electric car manufac-
turer required to show actual malice).
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these extensions by balancing the interests involved."' In personal
defamation, the individual's interest in his personal reputation is at
stake."' However, the interest in protecting the reputation of a
corporation or product is not as important as the individual's
reputation."' Further, the public's interest in information about cor-
porations or products may be greater than its corresponding interest
in individuals."1 9 This is especially true when the corporation is in-
volved in matters which significantly impact the public, or when pro-
duct information concerns health and safety matters. Therefore, the
New York Times standard should apply to corporate defamation and
product disparagement actions. Determining the applicability of the
standard on a case-by-case basis however, presents some problems.
B. Corporate Defamation Plaintiffs
In determining whether a corporate plaintiff is subject to the
New York Times standard in a corporate defamation action, the courts
have used two tests. Some courts have used the Gertz public figure
test,20 while others have used the Rosenbloom public interest test.'
The first opportunity for a court to determine whether a corporation
fit into one of the three public figure categories outlined in Gertz was
in Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper."n The court in
Martin-Marietta held that the Gertz public figure test was inapplicable
to corporations.'2 The court reasoned that implicit in the public figure
concept was the conclusion that society had an interest in the plain-
tiff and his activities. 24 Since not all corporate plaintiffs and their
activities would be of interest to society, it would be unfair to
categorize corporations as public figures." The court also determin-
ed that the purpose of the Gertz public figure test was to protect
116. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 33.
118. The individuars interest in protecting his reputation "reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being ......
Bose Corp. 508 F. Supp. at 1270 (quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92) (Stewart, J., con-
curring). However, damage to a product's reputation, unlike damages to the reputa-
tion of an individual, can always be measured in terms of monetary loss. Also, the
manufacturer almost always has access to the media to rebut the disparaging state-
ment. Id- But see Bruno & Stillman Inc. v. Globe Newspapers Co., 633 F.2d 583, 590
(1st Cir. 1980) (the assumption that the corporation's interest in protecting its own
reputation is less important than that of an individual is overbroad).
119. See Bose Corp., 508 F. Supp. at 1270-71.
120. See infra note 135.
121. See, e.g., Martin-Marietta, 417 F. Supp. 947. See also infra note 132.
122. 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).
123. Martin-Marietta, 417 F. Supp. at 955-56.
124. Id. at 956.
125. Id.
1985]
Morgan: The First Amendment and the Corporate Plaintiff:  Applicability o
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
864 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
the reputation and private lives of individuals.12 Since a corporation
does not have a personal reputation or private life, and an action on
behalf of a corporate plaintiff certainly does not involve the essential
dignity of every human being, the court limited Gertz to its facts.' 7
In rejecting Gertz, the court adopted the Rosenbloom public
interest test.2 ' The court felt that this analysis would protect cor-
porations when their activities were of little interest to society.'29 Us-
ing this test, the court found that Martin-Marietta's entertainment
of defense department personnel at a privately funded stag party was
in the public interest." Therefore, the corporate plaintiff was required
to prove actual malice.'' The analysis used by the Martin-Marietta
court, however, has not become the majority view.'32
The next court to address whether a corporation must show
actual malice chose not to follow the lead established by the Martin-
Marietta court. In Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press,'"
the corporate plaintiff charged the defendant with incorrectly report-
ing a Federal Trade Commission release.' The court adopted the Gertz
public figure test to determine the applicability of the New York Times
standard. 3 ' The court rejected the distinction Martin-Marietta made
126. Id. at 955-56.
127. Id.
128. The court approvingly cited Justice Brennan's Rosenbloom opinion in
reaching its decision: "The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus
is on the conduct of the participants and the context, effect, and significance of the
conduct, not on the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety." (quoting Rosenbloom,
403 U.S. at 43). Id. at 955.
129. Id. at 956.
130. The court found in the alternative that Martin-Marietta was a limited pur-
pose public figure under the Gertz test. Id. at 956.
131. The court held there was no evidence of actual malice and granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 961.
132. Another court used the Rosenbloom test in a corporate defamation action.
F & J Enterprises, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 292. This pre-Gertz decision held that a disparag-
ing statement about the plaintiffs product was a matter of public interest and re-
quired a showing of actual malice.
133. 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977). An FTC release stated the agency's
intent to issue a complaint against the plaintiff and seven other companies due to
unfair and deceptive practices. The defendant's failure to note the limited nature of
the charges against the plaintiff precipitated the corporate defamation action.
134. Id. at 817.
135. For other corporate defamation actions using the Gertz test see Steaks
Unlimited, 623 F.2d 264 (held meat producer to be a limited purpose public figure);
Bruno & Stillman Inc., 633 F.2d 583 (held boat manufacturer not to be a public figure);
General Products Co. Inc., 526 F. Supp. 546 (held manufacturer of chimneys not to
be a public figure); Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (held insurance underwriter to be an
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between an individual and a corporation, since under California law,
the protectable interests of both are the same.13 Also, the court felt
that Gertz had overruled Rosenbloom without qualification.137
In applying the Gertz status approach in Trans World Accounts,
Inc., the court, without setting forth its reason, held that the plaintiff
was not an all purpose public figure, nor a limited purpose public
figure.' The plaintiff did fall within the third "rare" category 39 of
an involuntary public figure, because it was drawn into the particular
controversy."0 The court held that the issuance of the FTC proposed
complaint drew the plaintiff into a particular controversy having an
origin in the plaintiffs own conduct.' Thus, the plaintiff was a public
figure for the limited range of issues relating to the FTC complaint."'
However, the requirement that a corporate plaintiff show actual malice
has not been limited to plaintiffs deemed involuntary public figures.
all purpose public figure); Vegood Corp. v. American Broadcasting, Etc., 25 Cal. 3d
763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980) (held
corporation engaged in closing out stores not to be a public figure).
136. The court said that the protectable interests in reputation of corporations
and individuals are the same, since under California law, both may recover special,
general and punitive damages. Trans World Accounts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. at 819. Reliance
for this proposition was placed on D. Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. American Federation of
Labor, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1963), which was decided prior to Gertz
which held that damages are limited to actual injury. The court in Trans World Accounts,
Inc. refused to distinguish corporations and individuals since both corporations and
individuals have the same protectable interests, and because of the difficulty in
distinguishing them.
The line between the interests of natural persons and corporations is
frequently fuzzy and ill-defined. Various legal considerations have long
led to the incorporation of businesses that are in economic reality but
individual proprietorships or partnerships. For that additional reason, it
seems for the purpose of applying the first amendment to defamation
claims, the distinction between corporations and individuals is one without
a difference.
Trans World Accounts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. at 819. But see Martin-Marietta, 417 F. Supp.
947 (the law of libel distinguishes between corporations and human plaintiffs by limiting
corporate recovery to actual damages in the form of lost profits).
137. Trans World Accounts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. at 819.
138. Id. at 819-20.
139. Id. at 821.
140. The holding in Trans World Accounts, Inc. that the corporate plaintiff was
an involuntary public figure since it was "drawn into a public controversy" is now
questionable. A more recent Supreme Court case, Wolston, 443 U.S. 157, refused to
characterize the plaintiff as a public figure on the grounds that plaintiff was "dragged
into a public controversy." Therefore, it is questionable what kind of involuntary con-
duct the Court will require to be deemed an involuntary public figure.
141. Trans World Accounts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. at 821.
142. Id.
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In Reliance Insurance Company v. Barron's,' the court adopted
the Gertz public figure test and said that corporate plaintiffs deemed
all purpose public figures and limited purpose public figures would
also be required to show actual malice. " ' In Barron's, the corporate
plaintiff, an insurance underwriter, instituted a libel action against
the defendant financial magazine. " The complaint alleged that an
article concerning plaintiffs proposed stock offering was libelous. "6
The court found that the plaintiff was both an all purpose public figure
and a limited purpose public figure. "
The court determined that the plaintiff was an all purpose public
official, that is, one who has assumed "especial prominence in the
affairs of society," 8 because the plaintiffs assets exceeded one billion
dollars and its commons stock was publicly traded. "9 Also, the court
said that there was "great interest" during the past several years
in the plaintiff corporation and its activities." Although the court said
it was adopting the Gertz status approach, the finding that the public
had a "great interest," is an inquiry only Rosenbloom would require.
This justification for the court's public figure determination indicates
the difficulty in adhering to a strict Gertz status approach. In addi-
tion, the court found the plaintiff to be a limited purpose public
figure."' The plaintiffs proposed $50 million stock offering was suffi-
cient for the court to conclude that the plaintiff was "thrusting itself
into the public arena."'' 2 Therefore, the plaintiff would be required
to show actual malice under this theory at least to the extent of issues
concerning the stock offering.'53
The decisions in Martin-Marietta, Trans World Accounts, Inc.,
and Barron's indicate the struggle courts have in determining whether
a plaintiff in a corporation defamation action must show actual malice.
These courts have used both the Rosenbloom public interest test and
the Gertz public figure test. Furthermore, the courts have tried to
143. 442 F. Supp. at 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
144. Id. at 1348.
145. Id. at 1344.
146. Id. at 1345-46.
147. Id. at 1348.
148. Id. at 1347 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
149. Id. at 1348.
150. The "great interest" the court found was the circumstances surrounding
the acquisition of the corporate plaintiff by another corporation some eight years before
the defamation. Id. at 1344, 1348.
151. Id. at 1348.
152. Id.
153. Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 [1985], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss4/3
CORPORATE PLAINTIFF
fit the corporate defamation plaintiff into each of the three public
figure categories developed in Gertz. Since plaintiffs in product
disparagement actions are frequently corporations or similarly situated
businesses,"u and there are several similarities between product
disparagement and corporate defamation, the corporate defamation
decisions can be a source of guidance in product disparagement actions.
B. Product Disparagement Plaintiffs
Although the product is the object of a defamatory statement
in a product disparagement action, the courts have looked to the status
of the product's manufacturer to see if the plaintiff is a public figure."
This approach is consistent with the approach in corporate defama-
tion actions. However, since the disparaging statement about a product
concerns only the limited issues related to the product itself, and not
to the manufacturer as a whole, the courts have centered their analysis
on the Gertz limited purpose public figure category.10 This analysis
requires the existence of a public controversy. 57 To interpret what
the Supreme Court means by "public controversy," as distinguished
from "an issue of public or general concern,"'" the federal district
court in Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of the United States, Inc.,"5
opted to make two inquiries. "' The first inquiry is whether there is
a public controversy preceding the alleged defamation."" The second
154. See, e.g., Bose Corp., 692 F.2d 189 (where plaintiff is a corporate manufac-
turer of stereo loudspeakers); Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Develop-
ment Corp., 555 F.2d 1131 (3rd Cir. 1977) (where plaintiff is a corporate lottery con-
sulting firm); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (where plaintiff is a limited partnership selling exercise equipment); Simmons
Ford, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (where plaintiff is a corporate manufacturer of electric
cars); General Products Co., Inc., 526 F. Supp. 546 (where plaintiff is a corporate manufac-
turer of chimneys).
155. See, e.g., Simmons Ford, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (automobile retailer cannot
assert product disparagement claim on behalf of manufacturer).
156. See, e.g., Bose Corp., 692 F.2d 189; Simmons Ford, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742.
157. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
158. "Distinguishing what would be 'an issue of public or general concern' under
Rosenbloom, from 'public controversy' under Gertz is not a clearcut task. To the extent
we distinguish, we find ourselves returning to the job which the court in Gertz felt
it had liberated us from." Bruno & Stillman, Inc., 633 F.2d at 590.
159. 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass.), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 189 (1st
Cir. 1981), afJ'd, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
160. The two inquiries originated in Bruno & Stillman Inc., 633 F.2d 583. which
was framed as a corporate defamation action, although the defamatory statements con-
cerned the quality of boats manufactured by the plaintiff.
161. Gertz requires public figures, other than all purpose public figures, to have
thrust themselves to the forefront of a public controversy. This implies a pre-existing
controversy. This implication is reinforced by the ruling that, "Those charged with
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is what the nature and extent of the plaintiffs participation is in the
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 62
In Bose Corp., the defendant, a consumer magazine, published
an article evaluating stereo loudspeakers." The defendant's statement
that "individual instruments ... tended to wander about the room,"
was found to have attributed a grotesque quality to the product and
was therefore harmful to its reputation.'" The court found the plain-
tiff to be a public figure and required a showing of actual malice. 65
In its determination of public figure status, the court first looked to
whether a public controversy preceded the defamation.16 Since the
plaintiff was emphasizing the unique design of the Bose 901 speaker,
defamation cannot by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the
claimant a public figure." Hutchison, 443 U.S. at 135. See Steaks Unlimited, Inc., 623
F.2d 264 (a pre-existing controversy exists when complaints to a television station
about quality and price of plaintiff's meats preceded the broadcast of the allegedly
defamatory statement).
162. Thrusting oneself into the vortex of a public controversy to influence its
outcome suggest voluntary conduct by the plaintiff. See Bruno v. Stillman, Inc., 633
F.2d 583 (activity and success of middle-echelon manufacturer-merchant is not suffi-
cient to make it a public figure). But see Steaks Unlimited, Inc., 623 F.2d 264 (evidence
of voluntary conduct where advertising blitz invited public attention, comment, and
criticism); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932
(2d Cir. 1980) (voluntary conduct where plaintiff was active opponent of fluoridation,
had written 15 articles, testified in Congress. and obtained wide publicity for himself
and his views).
163. Bose Corp., 692 F.2d at 190.
164. Id. at 192-93. The defendant attempted to characterize the statement in
the article as a non-actionable opinion, rather than a statement of fact. The Supreme
Court has held that opinions are constitutionally privileged. "Under our constitution,
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the com-
petition of other ideas." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 33940. The Court of Appeals recognized
that an opinion is not actionable and can be neither true nor false, but shed no light
on the nature of this statement. An opinion may be actionable if undisclosed defamatory
facts are implied as the basis for the opinion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 566
(1977). See generally Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-Dispute in
Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962).
165. The finding for the plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Appeals due
to lack of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Bose Corporation conceded
on appeal the district court's public figure finding. The Court of Appeals stated that
its holding in no way passed upon the merits of the district court's public figure deter-
mination. See Bose Corp., 692 F.2d at 197 (Campbell, J., concurring). The United States
Supreme Court heard the case to determine whether the clearly-erroneous standard
of review pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) was applicable to a deter-
mination of actual malice. Bose Corp., - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1949. The Supreme
Court likewise did not pass on the question of whether the Bose Corporation was
a public figure. Id at 1955 n.8.
166. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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had been extensively promoting the speaker, and was soliciting
reviews of the product, the court found a controversy existing at the
time of the defendant's article.'" The court went on to say that the
controversy was "public" rather than "private," since loud speaker
manufacturers and reviewers for nationally published magazines were
involved in the controversy, and that "a reasonable person would have
expected persons beyond the immediate participants in the dispute
to feel the impact of its resolution."" 8 Since the number of people
impacted was the key to the finding of a "public" controversy, which
is a quantitative approach, rather than a qualitative one, this deci-
sion would appear to contradict post-Gertz decisions."'
After a finding of a pre-existing public controversy, the next
inquiry involves the nature and extent of the plaintiffs participation
in the controversy. In Bose Corp., the court characterized the plain-
tiffs participation as "extensive.""' The extensive advertising and
solicitation of reviews, which clearly invited public attention, comment
and criticism, was evidence of voluntary conduct by the plaintiff."'
Thus, the findings that a public controversy preceded the defamation
and that the plaintiff voluntarily engaged in the controversy satisfied
the court that the Bose Corporation was a limited purpose public
figure and required to show actual malice."72
C. Determining Public Figure Status of Corporate Plaintiffs
The application of the New York Times standard to corporate
defamation and product disparagement actions is inevitable. The con-
167. Bose Corp., 508 F. Supp. at 1273.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
170. Bose Corp., 508 F. Supp. at 1273.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1274. The court in Simmons Ford, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 743, found
the corporate plaintiff in a product disparagement case to be a public figure and required
to show actual malice. The court did not address the plaintiffs activities or the issues
involved in making this determination. The court did cite Bose Corp. in its decision,
but this reliance appears misplaced. Bose Corp., held that the actual malice standard
applies to product disparagement actions, "at least when plaintiff is a public figure."
See Simmons Ford, Inc., 516 F. Supp. at 744 n.4 [Emphasis added.]. In comparison,
Simmons Ford, Inc.. appears to have adopted a per se rule that corporations are public
figures in product disparagement actions. The court in Simmons Ford, Inc., may have
made its actual malice determination based on the common law standard of fault for
product disparagement actions, which does not address the status of the plaintiff. The
common law standard requires plaintiff to show actual malice, ill will, or intent to
interfere. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 623A (1977) and supra notes 109-113
and accompanying text. For product disparagement cases basing liability upon the
common law principles of fault, see General Products Co., Inc., 526 F. Supp. 546; Systems
Operations, Inc., 555 F.2d 1131.
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tinued expansion of New York Times and its progeny and the emphasis
on free speech and press suggest this expansion.'7 The balancing of
the interests in personal defamation, as compared to corporate defama-
tion and product disparagement, would also suggest this result.''
However, application of the New York Times standard to the corporate
plaintiff on a case-by-case basis has not been consistent.'"
Application of the Rosenbloom public interest test to corporate
plaintiffs has merit since it encourages the ventilation of issues which
the public finds important. Information about a corporation or product
may be more important to the public than information about a can-
didate running for office. This raises the question of what is in the
public interest. A pure quantitative approach would suggest that movie
stars would be the group the greatest number of people would want
to know about.' Certainly this would not reflect the underlying ra-
tionale of New York Times, which was to protect political speech."
This approach would also be ineffective in protecting the reputation
of a corporation or product. The inadequacy of the Rosenbloom test
is also apparent due to the ease with which courts find a corporation
or a product to be in the public interest." Subjecting the small cor-
poration to the New York Times standard upon a finding that the issue
was in the public interest would render such a plaintiff remediless
173. See supra notes 10-52 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 120-54 and accompanying text.
176. One commentator suggests that the GCrtz status based approach would
also find movie stars to be all purpose public figures, since they are the best known
public figures in the country and Gertz removed the subject matter of the controversy
from the test. Whether an inquiry into the subject matter has been in fact removed
from the Gertz test is questionable. Rather, the Court appears to have failed in ad-
dressing what type of subject matter will constitute a public controversy. In any event,
finding well known people like movie stars to be public figures without regard to
society's interest in the subject matter has little relevancy to the central meaning
of the first amendment. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 623-24.
177. Speech critical of government and public officials was given first amend-
ment protection in New York Times. Justice Brennan's seditious libel analysis was
the crux of his opinion. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 273. Justice White also
emphasizes in his dissent in Gertz that the central meaning of the first amendment
is that libel law as it relates to criticism of government and public officials is beyond
the police power of the State. New York Times and its progeny was never intended
to deprive private citizens of recourse to redress injury to reputation. Justice White
noted that raising the threshold liability standard and limiting damages to actual injury
is not the course envisioned by the Court in New York Times. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 387
(White, J., dissenting).
178. One commentator suggests that the public interest test is a bootstrap
expression, since anything published may be said to be in the public interest. See Eaton,
supra note 1, at 624.
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to rebut the falsity. The small corporation could not rebut the falsity
due to the lack of resources necessary for media access and the dif-
ficulty in proving actual malice. Therefore, the public interest test
would result in harsh and arbitrary decision making.
Some courts have applied the Gertz all purpose public figure
category to corporate plaintiffs.'" This may result in a strong tendency
to deem all corporations public figures."8 Although a per se rule of
this type is attractive to the courts because of its broad and clear
definition, it also results in arbitrary decision making. A per se rule
would place the small or close corporation on the same level as a multi-
billion dollar corporation."8 ' Certainly a small business does not give
up its reputation and privacy rights by the mere act of incorporation.
Although such a result is clearly arbitrary, one may argue that at
least the very large corporations should be public figures.
Addressing corporate characteristics such as volume of sales,
amount of assets, or influence on society would be an alternative to
determining public figure status of corporations. It could be argued
that the larger corporations have greater access to the media and
are more likely to have assumed the risk of public exposure."
However, the Gertz status-based approach does not consider the
public's interest in the information. As Justice Brennan noted in his
dissent in Gertz, a Gertz status approach leads to the paradoxical result
of dampening issues of interest to the public because they happen
to involve private citizens, while encouraging discussion of issues
involving public figures, even though no one is interested in such
information."" Finding large corporations to be public figures would
encourage the discussion of issues in which the public may have little
interest. An additional danger where corporate plaintiffs are public
figures is the difficulty these plaintiffs have in overcoming the actual
malice standard. The imposition of the New York Times standard,
which has been referred to as an "insurmountable barrier,"'' has
resulted in "near-immunity"'I' from defamation judgments. Fortunately,
few courts have applied the all purpose public figure category to the
corporate plaintiff.
179. See, e.g., Barton's, 442 F. Supp. 1341.
180. See Note, supra note 56, at 990.
181. Id.
182. The access to the media rationale has been criticized by one court as "no
more than makeweight." Barron's, 442 F. Supp. at 1348. Another court has held that
most corporations have no more access to the media than a private person. See Bruno
& Stillman, Inc., 633 F.2d at 589. See also supra notes 35, 37.
183. Gertz, 418 U.S. 364 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 338.
185. See Eaton, supra note 1, at 1394.
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One other approach the courts have used in determining whether
corporate plaintiffs must show actual malice is the Gertz involuntary
public figure category. " ' An involuntary public figure is one who,
through no purposeful activity of his own, is drawn into a public con-
troversy. The validity of this category is in doubt. In one post-Gertz
case, the court refused to classify a plaintiff who failed to appear in
court and was linked to Soviet espionage as a public figure.'87 The
court reasoned that the plaintiff was "dragged unwillingly into a public
controversy."'8 When the court will find involuntary conduct suffi-
cient for a public figure determination is unknown. This type of
activity is certainly not in agreement with the assumption of risk
rationale for public figure status.' 9 Therefore, application of this
category to corporate plaintiffs should be avoided. Courts could find
this category to be a convenient catch-all when there is no evidence
of voluntary conduct by the corporate plaintiff.
The limited purpose public figure category is the rationale most
widely used when corporate plaintiffs in corporate defamation and
product disparagement actions are found to be public figures.' " Since
this category requires one to have thrust himself into a public
controversy, the difficulty courts have found is in defining "public
controversy." Post-Gertz cases in the personal defamation area sug-
gest that the quality of the issue is important. 9' However, the Supreme
Court has given no indication of what is a quality issue. Furthermore,
some courts, in addressing public controversy involving corporate
plaintiffs, have looked to the number of people involved. 9' This quan-
titative approach closely resembles the Rosenbloom public interest
test."' Therefore, in order to curb this confusion, courts should give
greater substance to the term "public controversy" in both personal
defamation actions and actions for corporate defamation and product
disparagement.
A suggested approach to defining public controversy in the cor-
porate defamation and product disparagement area would include both
186. See, e.g., Trans World Accounts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 814.
187. See Wolston, 443 U.S. 157.
188. Id. at 157. See supra note 140.
189. See infra note 193.
190. For cases finding corporate plaintiff to be a limited purpose public figure,
see Bose Corp., 692 F.2d 189; Steaks Unlimited, Inc., 623 F.2d 264; Trans World Accounts,
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 814; Martin-Marietta, 417 F. Supp. 947.
191. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Bose Corp., 508 F. Supp. at 1273.
193. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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a qualitative and quantitative analysis. This approach would be a com-
promise between the strict Gertz status test and the Rosenbloom public
interest test. By balancing these two factors to determine whether
a public controversy exists, the court would be considering both the
importance of the issue and the number of people interested in the
issue.
The importance of the issue, or the qualitative analysis, could
be more widely defined than the corresponding definition in the per-
sonal defamation context. A quality issue should be more than those
issues related to government. A product deficiency which relates to
health and safety matters or corporate activities related to
environmental hazards would certainly be a quality issue. However,
a slight deficiency in a product which merely renders the product a
"poor buy" should not be a qualitative issue because this would sub-
ject the corporate plaintiff to the New York Times standard in nearly
all instances of false criticism. This qualitative determination should
be balanced with a quantitative determination to see if there is a public
controversy.
The number of people interested or affected by an issue relating
to a corporation or product is a relevant inquiry in determining
whether a corporate plaintiff must show actual malice. This approach
was used by the Rosenbloom Court and implicitly by courts using the
Gertz test.'" This inquiry encourages the ventilation of issues in which
the public has an interest. Since this inquiry is balanced with the
qualitative approach, the danger of subjecting small corporations to
the actual malice standard is minimized. Therefore, in determining
whether a public controversy exists in the corporate defamation and
product disparagement area, both quality and quantity inquiries should
be balanced. The courts should also address whether the public
controversy was existing at the time of the defamation and whether
the corporate plaintiffs activities were voluntary.
A pre-existing controversy requirement ensures that the issue
is of interest to the public prior to the defamation. Otherwise, the
media defendant could create its own defense by bringing the
corporate plaintiff into the center of attraction. This requirement
would also disregard the corporate plaintiffs activities after the
defamation, such as the rebuttal efforts, which are a result of the
defamation. Therefore, only activities by the corporate plaintiff prior
to the defamation would be addressed.
194. I&
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The plaintiff's activities prior to the defamation should also be
voluntary. Voluntary activity by the corporate plaintiff is the only
activity consonant with the assumption of risk rationale."' What con-
stitutes voluntary activity would be for the courts to determine, but
several decisions provide guidance. Merely placing a product on the
market'" or being a successful business 7 has not been sufficient to
constitute voluntary conduct, while promotional activities described
as an advertising blitz have.198
Therefore, courts should address whether the corporate plain-
tiffs activities were voluntary, whether a controversy preceded the
defamation, and whether the controversy is public, by balancing both
the quality of the issue involved with the quantity of people interested.
This modification of the limited purpose public figure category would
give courts in corporate defamation and product disparagement actions
greater guidance in evaluating the relevant interests and would result
in more equitable and consistent decision making.
CONCLUSION
Balancing the interests of free speech with protection of reputa-
tion suggests that corporate defendants in corporate defamation and
product disparagement actions should be given first amendment
protection. This first amendment protection is afforded by requiring
the corporate plaintiff to show actual malice in order to recover.
However, a threshold examination of the source and purpose of the
defamatory or disparaging statement is necessary. If the statement
is made by a trade competitor advancing his own economic interests,
the expression will be deemed commercial speech and unprotected
due to its falsity. If the statement is by the media whose intent is
to inform the public, the expression is pure speech and entitled to
full first amendment protection. However, the determination on a case-
by-case basis of whether the corporate plaintiff must show actual
malice is in a state of confusion.
195. The common law defense of assumption of risk required that the plaintiff
know and understand the risk and that the choice to incur the risk be free and volun-
tary. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 68, at 447. However, due to the lack of voluntary
activity by an involuntary public figure, this plaintiff cannot be said to have assumed
the risk of public exposure. Since part of the underlying rationale for requiring public
figures to show actual malice is not evident, the involuntary public figure category
should not be a basis of requiring the plaintiff to show actual malice.
196. See Vegood Corp., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97.
197. See Bruno & StiUman, Inc., 633 F.2d 583.
198. See Steaks Unlimited, Inc., 623 F.2d 264.
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Some courts have used the Rosenbloom public interest test in
determining whether actual malice must be shown. This broadsweep-
ing rule gives little deference to the small corporation who may not
have access to the media to rebut or resources to prove falsity. Other
courts have used the various Gertz public figure categories. The all
purpose public figure category produces arbitrary results because it
fails to consider the public's interest. The involuntary public figure
category is inequitable because it does not require voluntary conduct
by the corporate plaintiff. The limited purpose public figure category
appears appropriate for corporate defamation and product disparage-
ment actions, but the confusion over what is a public controversy has
led to inconsistent results. This note suggests that public controversy
should be determined by balancing the quality of the issue with the
number of people interested in or impacted by the issue. By also re-
quiring voluntary conduct by the corporate plaintiff and the existence
of the public controversy prior to the defamation, the courts will have
more guidance in applying the actual malice standard to these actions.
This will result in more consistent decision making by the courts and
less of a chilling effect upon information about corporations and their
products.
STEVEN B. MORGAN
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